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Abstract: 
Traditional theories of the origins of the welfare state have emphasized 
the financial weakness of Britain’s largest provider of mutual insurance in the 
late 19th century, the friendly societies.  These theories share common 
implications with contemporary theories of institutional change popularized by 
Douglas North and others.  Of prime importance is the contention that ageing 
memberships and declining popularity forced mutual insurers, a prominent 
feature of the Victorian age, into financial distress and tacit support of state 
pension schemes. 
This argument, though supported by secondary sources from the period, 
has never been quantitatively scrutinized. This paper, inspired by the path-
breaking work of Emery and Emery (1999) on North American friendly societies, 
seeks to partially remedy this gap. Using data from the Ancient Order of 
Foresters archives, it does this in two ways. First, it isolates the determinants of 
late 19th century friendly society membership in a cross-sectional regression 
framework.  Second, it computes two empirical tests of financial viability for 
each society lodge: the implicit share of risk loading and the probability of ruin. 
These values improve upon conventional literature by more precisely defining 
financial insolvency and by more accurately capturing the financial decisions 
facing lodges.  Results suggest that though the friendly societies were the 
domain of the old, they were more financially resilient than has been previously 
assumed.  These findings cast doubt on traditional theories of the origins of the 
welfare state, suggesting a stronger role for political consensus and 
compromise in the understanding the 1908 Act.    
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“The great things in life are almost always the quiet, unnoticed growths 
amongst the rank and file of the people.” 
Eltweed Pomeroy 
The English Friendly Societies, 19021 
 
 
I:  Introduction: The Significance of 1908  
The 1908 Old Age Pensions Act marks a decisive shift in British 
welfare state policy.  State expenditure on the elderly and poor has 
increased dramatically as a share of GDP since 1908, and the non-
contributory pensions established by the 1908 legislation paved the way 
for the 1925 contributory pension. Similarly, the passage of the 1911 
National Insurance Act evolved from the debate preceding the 1908 Act. 
Though it would be hyperbolic to claim that 1908 initiated a British 
advance towards Socialism, the Act’s importance in the eventual growth 
of the British welfare state should not be understated.      
1908 will thus serve as a benchmark in this study.  The year’s 
symbolic power is significant: it marks the transition from a Britain 
sceptical of state involvement in public affairs to one willing to accept its 
offers of help; it coincides with the institutional death of the self-help 
movement that defined Victorian Britain; and, in some ways, it 
foreshadows the relocation of British working-class policymaking from the 
industrial North to the chambers of Parliament in London.  Hennock, in a 
long essay on the German precedent of British social reform, echoes 
these sentiments: “For the [history of pensions policy] as for so many 
other aspects of British social reform, it is 1908 that marks the decisive 
turning point.”2   
                                                 
1 Found amongst assorted documents at the LSE library archives, June 10, 2009  
2 Hennock, British Social Reform and German Precedents, 1987, pp. 112 
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Britain’s appetite for social reform did not, of course, miraculously 
transform in the eve of a new year; the roots of the 1908 Act are many 
and diverse.  Many explanations have been presented, some of which will 
feature heavily in this paper.  Industrialists have explained welfare state 
policy in terms of the need to rid competitive markets of unproductive, 
sickly, or aged workers.3  Socialists and others sympathetic to the poor 
have emphasized the association between poverty and old age and the 
debilitating effects of the poor law on economic and social performance.4  
Comparative historians have argued that Britain’s experiment with social 
welfare reform was a response—as much out of fear as awe—to 
Germany’s institutionalization of compulsory state insurance and 
pensions schemes as early as 1883.5  Around this constellation orbits 
other, more specialized explanations for the emergence of the British 
welfare state.  Prominent among these alternative hypotheses is the 
contention that the friendly societies, one of the primary sources of mutual 
aid in Victorian England, were increasingly insolvent in the late 19th 
century and were unable to maintain their traditional opposition to state 
interference.6   
This paper does not seek to refute or seriously challenge the three 
principal hypotheses mentioned above.  It will provide a quantitative test 
to the last—the insolvency of the friendly societies.  The friendly societies 
were the strongest and most politically influential of the providers of 
sickness and old age insurance in Victorian England.  They were also 
highly symbolic organizations, promoting in their ritualistic meetings and 
antiquated garb an ethos of self-help and individualism that implicitly 
opposed state intervention in social welfare.  The death of the friendly 
                                                 
3 See: Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of 
Public Expenditure, 1975 
4 See: Thane, Old Age History; Charles Booth, The Aged Poor in England and Wales 
5 Hennock, Social Reform  
6 Gilbert, National Insurance 
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societies and their replacement with state institutions thus reinforces the 
significance of 1908 in Britain’s social history.   
This paper’s decision to focus on the friendly societies extends 
beyond social and historical import.  The friendly societies also allow for 
compelling hypothesis construction.  Inspired by literature on institutional 
change in the tradition of Douglass North, Oliver Williamson and others, 
this paper takes as its starting point the suggestion that economic 
institutions change upon fluctuations in relative prices, or the ability to 
complete economic transactions.  As the largest insurance institutions in 
England prior to state intervention, the friendly societies represent the 
habitat in which such fluctuations in economic efficacy would have taken 
place.  In this limited way, the financial viability of the friendly societies 
acts as a proxy for the probability of state intervention in the insurance 
market.   
 
 
II.  The Structure and Style of the English Friendly Societies 
 In the catalogue of remedies for the challenges of 19th century 
working-class life, the friendly societies enjoy a minor fame as the primary 
carriers of the ethic of self-help.  Neave describes the friendly societies as 
the “largest and most representative working-class organization” in late 
19th century Britain.7  His comments are complemented by Gilbert, who 
declares that “the friendly societies epitomized the Victorian ideals of thrift 
and respectability, of individual responsibility and self-help.”8  Though 
these descriptions betray some nostalgia for a more individualistic and 
fraternally vibrant past, they are at least symbolically true.  In almost 
                                                 
7 Neave, The Friendly Societies in England, 1996, pp. 41 
8 Gilbert, The Decay of Provident Institutions and the Coming of Old Age Pensions, 
1965, pp. 551 
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every public utterance, representatives of friendly societies took time to 
elaborate upon the values on which they were founded.     
 These values were embedded in the structure of the friendly 
societies.  Most societies collected annual or semi-annual dues which 
were then used to provide sickness and death benefits to members who 
had amassed a certain amount of contributions.  Contributions were 
usually fixed, though in later years some societies began charging higher 
fees for older entrants.9  It is notable that membership in a society usually 
required an application and the written approval of the Grand Master of 
the local lodge; this served both as a social and medical deterrent, 
ensuring that high-cost members were unable to join.  Societies typically 
met monthly, at the local public house or in a private lodge, to discuss 
business, drink spirits, enjoy the merriments of socializing, and share 
news from family and friends.  Some historians have suggested that the 
societies existed as much for social as for economic purposes, and in 
some smaller villages formed the backbone of secular social life.10  The 
1793 Act for the Encouragement and Relief of the Friendly Societies, for 
example, defined a friendly society as: 
 
“A society of good fellowship for the purpose of raising from time to 
time, by voluntary contributions, a stock or fund for the mutual relief 
and maintenance of all and every member thereof, in old age, 
sickness, and infirmity, or for the relief of widows and children of 
deceased members.”11 
 
It is unlikely that many societies performed all of these tasks, and 
the friendly societies of the 19th century were undoubtedly more formally 
developed than those of the late 18th century, the subject of this definition.  
Nonetheless, the vast majority of societies provided some form of 
                                                 
9 Gosden, The Friendly Societies in Britain, 1961 
10 Logan, interview at Foresters’ archives, June 3, 2009 
11 Act for the Encouragement and Relief of Friendly Societies, 1793, quoted in Neave, 
Friendly Societies in England, pp. pp. 42 
 5
sickness insurance for workers who could afford to pay regular 
contributions, and often provided a respectable funeral upon death. 
 Though the friendly societies maintained an image of self-help and 
mutualism, they were often viewed with suspicion from both the higher 
and lower classes, in particular members of the clergy.  Religious figures 
invoked disgust and curiosity at their ritualistic behaviour, which mimicked 
and sometimes mocked the formalism of the church.  Clergy, for example, 
sometimes expressed concern that upon death friendly society members 
replaced a proper Christian funeral with a secular one.  The societies’ 
propensity for drinking during their gatherings also inspired criticism from 
the church, as shown by the following quotation of a clergyman: 
 
“All who are familiar with friendly societies know very well that they 
mean a great deal more than the mere payment of certain 
premiums and the reception in time of need of certain equivalent 
benefits.  They know that they are clubs in another sense of the 
word also.  The name is associated in their minds with bands and 
banners, and processions with scarves and rosettes, with public 
house dinners and all their natural concomitants.  Too often the 
Club-day in a village means a day of drunkenness, a day on which 
respectable people shut up their houses and keep indoors, or take 
the opportunity of paying a visit to friends at a distance”12   
 
The perception that the friendly societies engendered a cultish sub-
culture of debauchery was largely inspired by their fondness for unusual 
names and rituals.  The affiliated orders of the societies—a largely 19th 
century phenomenon—almost always labelled themselves with a title 
invoking ancient times and culture: the Independent Order of Oddfellows; 
the Ancient Order of Foresters; the Ancient Order of Rechabites; or the 
Knights of the Maccabees.  The regalia and cultish rules surrounding 
                                                 
12 Quoted in Neave, Friendly Societies in England, pp. 56 
 6
these names inspired another clergyman to describe the affiliated 
branches as “half-heathen clubs utterly unlawful for a Christian man.”13   
 The friendly societies also enjoyed a mixed reputation with 
members of government and the political establishment.  Many societies 
listed members of parliament and the royal family as honorary, non-
contributory, members, though most societies refrained from declaring 
outright political allegiances.  As Gosden points out, the relationship 
between the friendly societies and the political elites of Victorian England 
was discontinuous and constantly evolving.14  In the early period of 
friendly society growth between 1815 and 1830, criticism of the societies 
emphasized the negative effects of mutual combination on village and 
town life.  A letter held in the Home Office records from a London 
engineer makes the point: 
 
“As long as bodies of journeymen are allowed to constitute 
themselves into societies under any denomination of benefit while 
the present laws of management of such societies exist, your 
memorialists have no hope of having the evils [of mischievousness 
and drunkenness] redressed.”15   
 
The fears generated by mutual combination under crude and 
arcane rituals characterized much of the early public and political reaction 
to the friendly societies.  Even in this atmosphere of suspicion, however, 
the friendly societies boasted significant political influence.  Because of 
the continuous stream of contributions required to join a society and take 
advantage of its support, membership in a friendly society was censored 
towards the better off.  Gilbert, for example, claims that “like Victorian 
England herself, the friendly society movement was rich, influential, and 
                                                 
13 Ibid, pp. 58 
14 Gosden, Friendly Societies 
15 Ibid, pp. 156 
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conservative.”16  Workers in unstable industries or with too little wages to 
pay the annual contributions would either have been expelled from the 
society for lack of payment—a common practice—or would not have 
joined in the first place.  In times of difficulty, such workers’ only recourse 
was the poor law.   
 The relationship between the friendly societies and the political 
establishment transformed during the campaigns surrounding the poor 
law reform of 1834.  The self-identification of many friendly societies as 
bastions of thrift and self-help must be understood in opposition to the 
apparent hedonistic decay associated with the poor law.  On many 
occasions, members of parliament or local government upheld the 
friendly societies as an alternative to the poor law.  The societies’ 
requirement of regular contributions mandated that members maintain 
work when able, and some evidence suggests that societies encouraged 
members to work rather than receive benefits in order to maintain the 
viability of the lodge and the dignity of their morals.17  The political use of 
the societies as an alternative to the poor law re-emerged in the 
campaign for old age pensions in the late 19th century.   
 
 
III. The Friendly Societies and the Campaign for Old Age 
Pensions 
In a seminal 1965 paper, Bentley Gilbert argued that the friendly 
societies were increasingly insolvent in the late 19th century due to the 
aging of their memberships and the inability to attract new, younger, and 
healthier recruits.18  Gilbert suggests that the de facto pensions that 
societies were providing their older members were insufficiently funded by 
                                                 
16 Gilbert, Provident Institutions, pp. 552-553 
17 Gosden, Friendly Societies 
18 Gilbert, Provident Institutions 
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contributions and were exposing lodges to the possibility of bankruptcy 
and dissolution, which further exacerbated the slowdown of member 
initiations.  This financial crisis led many friendly societies to seek 
external sources of support.  Though the friendly societies were staunchly 
opposed to state intervention in the mid-19th century, their deteriorating 
financial condition led many of them to tacitly support state pensions at 
the turn of the century in order to reduce their financial burden.  According 
to Gilbert, this shift in psychology amongst the friendly societies was a 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the passage of pension reforms 
in Parliament, and was a key force in the passage of the 1908 Old Age 
Pensions Act.  In Gilbert’s words: “So, on the first day of January 1909, 
old age pensions began in Great Britain with the acquiescence, if not the 
enthusiasm, of the friendly societies who had been a so important factor 
in their planning.”19  
This argument finds justification in several documents from the 
period.  The societies’ initial opposition to state pension schemes has 
been clearly noted, being labelled as grandfatherly legislation by one 
influential observer.20 The following passage, delivered in 1891 by the 
Grand Master of the Independent Order of Oddfellows, the largest of 
Britain’s friendly societies at the time, ably reflects the mood of many 
societies towards state intervention in their affairs: 
 
“Any scheme [for state pensions] must be a sound one, and framed 
within the true principles of actuarial and vital statistics—not a 
combination of honorary members’ contributions, collections, 
eleemosynary aid, occasional grants for benevolent funds, 
government subsidy, or by interference in the shape of proportional 
rebate by employers of labour.  We resent state interference in our 
affairs, and we feel that this would necessarily be the result of any 
state subsidy.”21 
                                                 
19 Ibid, pp. 563 
20 Williams, The Development of Old Age Pensions Policy in Britain, 1878-1925, 1970 
21 Quoted in Moffrey, Century, pp. 63 
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The Grand Master’s tone highlights the centrality of actuarial 
sophistication in early debates about friendly society insolvency.  
Exhortations of knowledge in actuarial analysis are common in many late 
19th century friendly society reports.  A short essay on the actuarial 
sciences found in the 1875 Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly 
Societies, for example, exudes a tone of paternalism towards those 
societies unversed in the details of actuarial science: 
 
“When a society by its rules offers benefits in exchange for certain 
fixed contributions, it is to be supposed that it looks upon those 
contributions as being enough to provide for the benefits; otherwise 
it would be dishonestly holding out promises which it cannot 
keep”22 
 
The new science of actuarial analysis, with its incomprehensible 
tables and robust reams of statistics, was accepted with varying degrees 
of jubilance in friendly society lodges.   
Just as the friendly societies clustered between those with and 
without an understanding of actuarial reports, the societies’ 
representatives were divided on the issue of state pensions.  The 
following passage from a representative of the Independent Order of 
Oddfellows delivered in the early 20th century—fewer than fifteen years 
after the previous passage was delivered—summarizes the change of 
tone within many of the societies:   
 
“That any well-considered and suitable scheme propounded by the 
legislature for the relief of the aged and infirm, benefiting our 
unfortunate brethren, will receive the cordial support of the 
Manchester Unity, provided that the pension is independent of the 
poor law, and does not create any power of government 
interference in the general management of the affairs of the 
Unity.”23 
                                                 
22 Report of the Chief Registrar, National Archives, Kew, 1875 
23 Quoted in Moffrey, Century, pp. 80 
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Here, the speaker invokes images of the poverty of old age and the 
misfortunes of those without proper relief.  The audience is expected to 
sympathize with the poor—again, from the dignified perch of a friendly 
society—and to recognize the need to distance the poor from the 
debilitating forces of the poor law.   
 In Gilbert’s argument, the friendly societies’ primary function in the 
history of old age pensions was to deflect support away from a 
contributory pension scheme modelled after the German experience 
towards a non-contributory one.24  The tension between advocates of 
contributory schemes and those in favour of non-contributory, tax-funded, 
pensions springs from the origins of the debate.  Both sides furiously 
presented their arguments.  A commentary by Charles Booth, noted 
poverty activist and an ardent supporter of non-contributory pensions, 
makes clear the fundamental issue: 
 
“It is impossible to conceive any plan by which contributions can be 
drawn from the masses of the people alongside of Friendly Society 
contributions without interfering with the Friendly Societies; nor 
could the Government enter into a sort of partnership with them, 
which is not only undesirable but would never be accepted.”25 
 
Indeed, arrangements were mentioned at various times which 
would have joined the friendly societies into an agreement with the 
government but never amassed significant support.26 
 The argument that the friendly societies helped shape the 1908 
legislation by their resistance to contributory pensions and their later 
support of non-contributory ones is buttressed by contemporary accounts.  
The feeling of financial insecurity amongst many societies was acute, 
                                                 
24 Gilbert, Provident Insitutions 
25 Quoted in Gilbert, Provident Institutions, pp. 561 
26 Gosden, Friendly Societies 
 11
although this was not unique to the later 19th century.27  As early as the 
late 18th century friendly societies were reported to be dissolving due to 
financial stress.  The extent and character of friendly society insolvency 
must therefore be more closely examined. 
 
 
IV. The Viability of the Friendly Societies: An Empirical Test   
 This paper will apply two quantitative tests to the hypothesis that 
the friendly societies were financially unviable institutions by the end of 
the 19th century and early 20th century.  The first will attempt to explain 
the determinants of friendly society membership across counties and 
across time.  The motivation for this test is the literature on the demand 
for insurance, and is framed in the context of the debate surrounding the 
relative merits of economic, demographic, and social explanations of 
friendly society membership.  Fundamentally, it seeks to differentiate 
between purely economic reasons for joining a friendly society and the 
demographic and social influences that shaped membership across 
space and time.  The second test will reassess the financial viability of the 
friendly societies.  It will be placed in the context of uncertainty regarding 
the actuarial estimates of insolvency in the 19th century and will attempt to 
provide new estimates that bypass the shortcomings of previous ones.  
The combination of these tests will offer an empirical characterization of 
the friendly societies in late 19th century Britain not yet established in the 
historical literature. 
 These quantitative tests can be situated around the symbolic 
dichotomy of an old man's society and a young man's society, articulated 
perhaps for the first time in detail in Emery and Emery.28  The old man's 
society exists to protect elderly men from the infirmities of their age.  The 
                                                 
27 Ibid 
28 Emery and Emery, A Young Man’s Benefit, 1996 
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sickness benefit is therefore a deferred annuity: it allows men to 
contribute to a fund in their healthy youth in order to draw from it in their 
sickly old age.  This view characterizes the friendly society as a sort of 
miniature pension scheme for the Victorian working class.  The young 
man's society exists for entirely different reasons.  The young man has no 
family or life savings, and is seldom sick; his membership in the friendly 
society is therefore driven by a desire to create a social and financial 
benefit structure from which he can draw in times of need. 
Figure 1: Foresters Total Membership and Number 
Admitted, 1875-1910
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A first attempt to extract the relative merits of these hypotheses is 
shown in Figure 1, which graphs total membership and annual 
admissions for the Ancient Order of Foresters, Britain’s second-largest 
friendly society, for the years 1875 to 1910, excluding 1894 and 1895 for 
which data was not available.29  As shown in the figure, while total 
Foresters’ membership increased steadily throughout the late 19th 
                                                 
29 Data source: Ancient Order of Foresters archives, accessed May 2009 
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century, admissions began declining as much as a decade earlier, around 
1890.  The data presented in Figure 1 offers some credibility to the 
hypothesis of the old man’s society: even as admissions fell steadily, total 
membership increased as rising life expectancies led the society to age.  
In order to draw meaningful conclusions from the analogy, however, and 
to assess the financial viability of the societies in the context of the 
analogy, a more rigorous test is needed.  Though Figure 1 offers some 
heuristic evidence in support of the perceived crisis within the friendly 
societies at the turn of the 20th century, it does not offer perspective on 
the dynamics of the crisis.        
Why were fewer men joining societies in the late 19th century?  
Various hypotheses have been proposed: Both Gosden and Moffrey have 
suggested that the societies held a much lower stature in the social 
hierarchy of late Victorian Britain than in earlier periods as modern 
technologies replaced the quaint excitement of mutualism and 
fraternization.30  Gilbert has suggested that the insolvency of the friendly 
societies at the time discouraged would-be members from joining.31  
Without personal testimonials, these hypotheses cannot be tested 
directly.  Quantitative techniques, however, allow for indirect tests that 
can isolate some of the forces driving the rise and eventual demise of the 
friendly societies.  A brief discussion of data sources will introduce the 
empirical tests.           
 
Data Sources: Problems and Possible Solutions   
 Data on the friendly societies can generally be found in three 
contexts: governmental, national, and local.  The most commonly used 
data for historical research are the annual records of the Chief Registrar 
of Friendly Societies, which were compiled from returns mailed in from 
                                                 
30 Moffrey, History; Gosden, Friendly Societies 
31 Gilbert, Provident Institutions 
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society lodges nationwide.  These included the number of members in the 
society, the value of its assets, and its location.  The coverage of the data 
is therefore determined by the number of records sent to the Chief 
Registrar, and is highly inconsistent. 
 
Table 1: Response Rates to Chief 
Registrar by County 
 
County 
Response 
Rate 
Essex 0.28 
Somerset 0.33 
Suffolk 0.34 
Hereford 0.34 
Hertfordshire 0.35 
Worcester 0.39 
Norfolk 0.39 
Warwick 0.40 
Gloucester 0.42 
Cornwall 0.44 
Stafford 0.44 
Huntingdonshire 0.44 
Nottingham 0.44 
Salop (Shropshire) 0.45 
Rutland 0.48 
Berkshire 0.49 
Wilts 0.49 
Buckinghamshire 0.49 
Devonshire 0.49 
Hampshire 0.50 
Monmouth 0.50 
Surrey 0.50 
Dorsetshire 0.51 
Oxfordshire 0.51 
Cumberland 0.52 
Bedfordshire 0.52 
Cambridge 0.52 
Northampton 0.55 
Westmoreland 0.55 
Cheshire 0.55 
Kent 0.56 
Middlesex 0.57 
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Lancashire 0.57 
Sussex 0.57 
Yorkshire 0.57 
Leicester 0.58 
Durham 0.58 
Derbyshire 0.59 
Northumberland 0.59 
Lincoln 0.64 
  
 
Table 1 shows the response rate for each county in year 1875, 
calculated as the number of returns received by the Chief Registrar in 
time for publication divided by the number of returns sent out to each 
county.  The relatively low response rates and their wide diffusion across 
counties, makes measures of the volume of friendly society membership 
impossible to estimate from the Chief Registrar's dataset; in order to 
make such estimates, untenable assumptions about unreturned forms 
would be required.  The records of the Chief Registrar also do not contain 
sufficient information to make estimates of society insolvency for two 
reasons.  First, they do not include information on the size of sick claims 
of the lodge each year, the fundamental ingredient for an insolvency test.  
Second, they provide little information on how funds were used within the 
society.  For example, the Chief Registrar's reports do not give 
information on the cost of maintaining the society each year—operating 
costs—or on the composition of the societies' assets—whether liquid or 
illiquid.  In light of these shortcomings, another data source is needed to 
perform the quantitative tests of this paper.  The obvious choice is the 
records of the societies themselves.  The affiliated orders—societies with 
both a national and local presence—provide the most comprehensive 
data and the most potential for national generalization.               
 The affiliated orders such as the Foresters and Oddfellows were 
international, complex, and highly organized institutions by the late 19th 
century.  The Foresters kept annual record books at the district level that 
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documented the financial progress of each court for each year.32  The 
accuracy of district classifications has received significant attention: 
Gosden notes that courts listed under Middlesex, for example, could 
actually be located in Northampton but registered in the London district.33  
Accordingly, Gosden reclassified the data for his major work on the 
history of the friendly societies.  The extent of this problem, however, is 
likely small, and this paper does not correct for the bias involved.  The 
district records hold information on the number of members in each court, 
the total worth of their funds, the number of members initiated in each 
year, the number of members who left in each year, and the total amount 
of sick claims paid out by each court in the year.  The way in which this 
data is constructed carries a number of advantages.  Unlike the data 
found in the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, the Foresters' data 
reflects a complete population of Foresters courts and therefore can be 
used to test the determinants of friendly society membership.  District 
accounts, however, give too little information about the financial 
operations of the courts to make meaningful insolvency estimates.  They 
provide no information on annual expenditure for operating costs or the 
composition of assets, sick payments, and income.  The annual balance 
sheets of the local courts are therefore the only source suitable for this 
sort of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 A note on terminology: most affiliated orders referred to their local branches as 
lodges, while the Foresters referred to them as courts 
33 Gosden, Friendly Societies 
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Table 2: Court Balance Sheet Summary Statistics 
     
Court Name 
Court 
Number Location 
Years (not always 
consecutive) Geography
Prince of Wales 3100 Stowmarket 1887-1914 Town 
Anchor of Hope 3603 Ipswich 1894-1911 Town 
Eleanor Rummyn 3182 London 1879-1910 City 
Pettiword 9056 Ipswich 1904-1915 Town 
Pride of Reading 4961 Reading 1885-1915 Town 
Brounlow 6444 Berkhamstead 1879-1895 Rural 
Equity 2992 Cambridge 1878-1911 Town 
Perseverence 6089 Bedmond 1880-1912 Rural 
     
 
The annual balance sheets of Foresters courts have received little 
or no scholarly attention.  The reason for this is undoubtedly logistic: of 
the roughly three thousand courts that made up the Foresters at the end 
of the 19th century, very few of the annual balance sheets are still 
available in the Foresters' archives for the late Victorian period.  The 
balance sheets for the eight courts included in this study were the only 
ones available for the relevant dates, though several more were available 
for the mid-20th century.  Table 2 shows the names, locations, and 
available years of the eight courts used.34  Though the courts are 
scattered across the country, the scarcity of balance sheets makes 
national generalization difficult.  One clear problem is survivor’s bias: the 
possibility that the balance sheets that still exist were associated with 
societies with long life spans and relatively few financial problems.  If this 
bias were strong, any estimate of financial viability that confirmed the 
soundness of the court would be inapplicable to other courts.  There are 
two reasons, however, why the problem of survivor’s bias might be 
insignificant.  First, as noted by Logan, societies failed to keep annual 
balance sheets for a number of reasons, not all of which were related to 
                                                 
34 It should be noted that the available years refers to the availability of some, but not 
all information; classification of courts as rural, town, or city, was made by Logan in 
accordance with the Foresters’ rules 
 18
financial insecurity.  For example, in a small village the secretary of a 
court might pass away leaving no one with the necessary skills to keep 
competent records; or the entire court might move locations or merge with 
another court, thus removing the need for a distinct balance sheet.  
Though both of these occurrences were likely to be rare, they are 
illustrative only, and are intended to capture the ephemeral nature of the 
lifespan of a normally operating court.  More importantly, there seems to 
be no indication that the courts for which balance sheets are available 
were abnormally successful in terms of life expectancy.  Most of the 
balance sheets cease in the years of World War I, around the time when 
the friendly society movement in general began to decline significantly.  
The problem of survivor’s bias should be noted but does not undermine 
the basic results of the paper. 
 
Table 3: Court Balance Sheet Averages 
     
Court Name 
Avg. Court 
Age 
Avg. Sick Pay 
(in £) 
Avg. 
Membership
Avg. Sick Pay per 
Member (in £) 
Prince of Wales 38.4 418.56 518 0.81 
Anchor of Hope 32 175.05 177 0.99 
Eleanor Rummyn 32.8 140.73 162 0.87 
Pettiword 3.5 110.83 161 0.69 
Pride of Reading 23 441.93 530 0.83 
Brounlow 10 131.58 182 0.72 
Equity 31.5 283.68 327 0.87 
Perseverence 25.8 171.23 238 0.72 
 
The annual balance sheets vary minimally across time and space, 
though some courts provide more information than others, likely the result 
of varying degrees of accountancy skills.  In general, they provide 
detailed annual accounts of the flow of funds in and out of the society, the 
age structure of the society, the amount of sick payments made to each 
member of the society, and miscellaneous information on the size and 
structure of the society.  Due to time constraints in digitizing the balance 
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sheets, not all of this information was used in this study.  Notably, 
information on the age structure of the courts, only available for certain 
years and certain courts, was excluded from the analysis.  Table 3 shows 
all-year averages for each court of the primary values included in the 
digitized dataset, including the average number of years the courts was in 
operation during the sampling period, the court’s average sick pay, the 
average membership, and sick pay per member.  Not shown in Figure 3, 
but central to the paper, are values relating to the courts’ operating costs, 
including income from contributions, interest, and other sources.  As 
shown in the table, average sick pay per member per year was relatively 
stable between courts, never greater than 1 or less than 0.69.  Average 
sick pay varied both with the court membership and the court age: as 
courts grew older, they attracted more members and paid out more sick 
benefits per member, reflecting the tendency for older courts to pay out 
more sick benefits.  These trends will receive greater scrutiny in 
subsequent sections.  The next section will present the justification for 
and methodology of a test of the determinants of friendly society 
membership.      
 
Test 1: Society Membership 
 Two strands of literature have emerged on the topic of the demand 
for friendly society membership.  Gosden has attributed the growth of 
societies in the early 19th century to the growing requirements of the 
industrial labour market.35  Other authors have emphasized the role of 
income growth in driving society membership: as workers became richer, 
they diverted more of their resources into luxury insurance schemes.36  
Other questions hover around this basic dichotomy: Was friendly society 
                                                 
35 Gosden, Friendly Societies 
36 Gorsky, The Growth and Distribution of English Friendly Societies in the Early 
Nineteenth Century, 1998; Benson, Coalminers, Accidents, and Insurance in Late 19th 
Century England, 2009 
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membership more concentrated in regions with certain industries such as 
mining or textiles?  Were Protestants more likely to join societies than 
Catholics?  Were societies the domain of the young or the old?  Were 
friendly societies more concentrated where use of the poor law was 
minimal?  A paucity of data at a meaningful level of spatial precision 
makes investigation of these hypotheses difficult.  Some studies, 
however, have made important progress. 
 Using data from the poor law returns of 1803 and 1813-15 and 
various censuses, Gorsky presents correlation statistics between friendly 
society membership and several other variables.  His primary findings are 
that friendly society growth is strongly correlated with the concentration of 
the mining and manufacturing sectors and that the timing of friendly 
society growth coincided strongly with the economic explosions of the 
industrial revolution.37  Gorsky’s reliance on correlations, however, which 
can produce spurious results and do not control for unseen or contingent 
effects, severely hinders his argument.  This paper seeks to improve 
upon this by using regression analysis to examine the determinants of 
membership into the Ancient Order of Foresters in the later parts of the 
19th century.  As the Foresters’ district-wide data is provided at a cross-
sectional, county level for a series of years, it represents a sort of panel.  
With this in mind, the following cross-sectional regression model with time 
dummies was run: 
YEARBachMedWageOldPopMembers ++++++= 543210 ρρρρρρ  
Where MEMBERS is the log of the number of members registered in a 
Foresters friendly society in each of the forty British counties for the years 
1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1905, and 1910; POP is the log of 
the population of each county in 1871 as reported in the 1871 census and 
compiled by Mitchell;38 OLD is the proportion of the population in each 
                                                 
37 Gorsky, Growth 
38 Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, 1988 
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county over the age of sixty from the 1861 census, and is meant to 
capture the possibility that friendly societies primarily attracted older, 
more sickly workers; WAGE is the agricultural wage in each district for 
1867-1870 from Hunt, and serves as a proxy for the income effect of 
insurance demand;39 MED is the number of medical men per 10,000 
persons in each county from the 1861 census, and accounts for the 
possibility that friendly society membership was constrained by the level 
of medical development of a town or region; BACH is the proportion of 
unmarried men in each county as reported in the 1861 census, and is 
meant to capture the young man’s effect—the possibility that younger 
men sought out friendly society membership in order to protect against 
financial and social insecurity; and YEAR represents a dummy variable 
for each of the years, excluding 1875.  The yearly dummies pick up any 
time-sensitive factors that are not absorbed into the other stationary 
variables.    
 A defence of the use of data from the 1861 census is required.  It is 
improbable that the age structure of a county in 1861 would approximate 
its age structure in 1910, from which some of the data is compiled.  Data 
from the 1861 census would therefore be ill-suited for an analysis of the 
determinants of friendly society admissions in 1910.  It is important to 
note that the dependent variable in the above regression is the log of the 
total membership of the district, and is therefore strongly connected to 
historical growth in membership.  Friendly societies in general, and in 
particular the Foresters, experienced rapid growth in the early 1860s, the 
effects of which lingered for most of the century.40  The regression 
therefore seeks to capture the demographic conditions at the time of 
significant society growth, the effects of which could still be felt at the 
early 20th century.   
                                                 
39 Hunt, Industrialization and Regional Inequality: Wages in Britain, 1986 
40 Gosden, Friendly Societies 
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Table 4: Membership Regressions 
Dependent variable: MEMBERS 
  Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
POP 1.103 19.73 0 
OLD 9.008 2.15 0.033 
WAGE 0.088 3 0.003 
MED 0.15 3.77 0 
BACH -0.043 -3.42 0.001 
1880 0.313 1.76 0.079 
1885 0.369 2.08 0.039 
1890 0.54 3.03 0.003 
1895 0.601 3.35 0.001 
1900 0.591 3.32 0.001 
1905 0.596 3.35 0.001 
1910 0.528 2.97 0.003 
R-squared: 0.61; Adj R-squared: 0.60; N=320 
 
Table 4 shows the regression results.  All of the variables are found 
to be statistically significant at the 95% level with the exception of the 
1880 yearly dummy.  As the dependent variable is the log of total 
membership, a one unit change in each of the coefficients can be 
interpreted as a change of one percent in the membership of the court.  
Foresters membership was significantly higher in regions with older 
populations in 1861 and was slightly lower in districts with a higher 
proportion of bachelors.  The agricultural wage, an imperfect proxy for 
wages in other occupations, has a relatively small effect in increasing 
Foresters membership.  Though weak, this finding lends some credibility 
to the argument that workers responded to the income effect: as wages 
increased, insurance against sickness became more desirable.  It is, of 
course, possible that the coefficient on wages is picking up by proxy a 
sort of industry effect: perhaps industries with higher wages, such as 
mining or manufacturing had close traditional ties to the friendly societies 
and also higher agricultural wages due to market competition.  This 
argument is partially buttressed by Gorsky’s finding that society 
membership was greater in mining and manufacturing than agriculture.  
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The positive coefficient on the proportion of medical men suggests that 
friendly societies operated within a medical infrastructure that facilitated 
their growth.  Indeed, many friendly societies paid their own doctors out of 
their sickness fund.  There is a possible identification problem with this 
result: the proportion of doctors in a district reported by the census 
examiners may be strongly related to the visibility of the friendly society 
movement in that district.  If the friendly societies acted as intermediaries 
between the census examiners and the doctors they observed, or if less 
visible forms of medicine operated outside of the realm of the friendly 
societies, these results would be biased. 
 A few conclusions can be gathered from the results in Table 4.  
Most notably, the friendly societies seem to be the domain of the old.  The 
coefficients on OLD and BACH in this regression seem to disprove the 
claim that societies existed primarily to provide a support mechanism for 
young workers who have no other social or financial network.  Counties 
with older populations and fewer bachelors grew their memberships 
during the boom of the 1860s, the effects of which lingered throughout the 
19th century.  This contrasts with Emery and Emery’s view of the old 
man’s society, and suggests that the friendly societies were vulnerable to 
the rising life expectancies of the late 19th century.  The effects of these 
demographic forces on the financial viability of the Foresters will be 
addressed in the next section.  
 
Test 2: Insolvency  
 It is widely believed amongst historians of the Victorian period that 
the friendly societies were increasingly insolvent as the 19th century 
progressed.  This argument is almost exclusively based on the accounts 
of 19th century actuaries, the majority of which were published in the 
years between the 1875 Friendly Societies Act and the Old Age Pensions 
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Act of 1908.41   The methods used by the actuaries were constantly 
evolving; indeed, the friendly societies were one of the first institutions to 
use sophisticated actuarial analysis.   
 Numerous flaws in the methods used by 19th century actuaries 
have been observed.  While the actuarial techniques used to address the 
insolvency of the friendly societies were well-suited for funded insurance 
programs, they were ill-suited for the pay-as-you-go schemes that 
societies actually ran.42  Societies kept their record books such that each 
year’s sick payments were balanced against contributions in that year; the 
contributions of new, younger members thus paid for the sickness of the 
old and decrepit.  Actuaries of the period, however, used experience 
tables, filled with information on expected life expectancy and the 
probability of sickness, to estimate the total liability of a lodge.43  On the 
income side of the actuarial tables lay all of the lodge assets in present 
and in future, adjusted for the interest rate.  If predicted benefits were 
sufficient to meet predicted liabilities, then the lodge was deemed solvent; 
if predicted benefits were less than predicted liabilities, than the lodge 
was reported to be insolvent.  In the reports of the Chief Registrar of 
Friendly Societies for the later years of the 19th century, more societies 
reported actuarial deficiencies than surpluses.44    
 Emery and Emery have observed five primary analytical flaws in 
these 19th century assessments.  First, and most well-known in 
contemporary writings, was the unpredictability of the interest rate.  For 
example, when the third valuation of the Independent Order of 
Oddfellows, Manchester Unity was published, it was accompanied by a 
lengthy explanation of why the second evaluation was inaccurate due to 
                                                 
41 See: Neison, Sickness, 1882; Moffrey, Century 
42 Emery and Emery, A Young Man’s Benefit, 1997 
43 Ibid 
44 Report of the Chief Registrar 
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unforeseen changes in the interest rate.45  This acknowledgement 
dampened the spirits of the Oddfellows, who prided themselves in their 
progressive pricing practices and protection against insolvency.  
Estimates reliant on assumptions about the interest rate are especially 
unreliable along the long time horizons necessary for estimating the 
future liabilities of a friendly society. 
 A second problem with the actuarial estimates that Emery and 
Emery note is that they do not take into account the addition of new 
members to the society.  In a pay-as-you-go system, the addition of new 
members is the strongest antidote to financial insolvency.  The patterns in 
Figure 1 show, however, that Foresters’ admissions began to fall around 
1890 though actuarial accounts from as early as 1875 show large 
deficiencies.46  It should be noted that while admissions were declining 
steadily since 1890, total membership rose well beyond that year, only 
declining in the early years of the 20th century.    
A third critique of historical actuarial estimates is that they do not 
take into account the possibility that members could change their 
membership dues over time. Lodges were highly democratic, and while a 
significant faction of members was strongly opposed to the curious 
estimates of the actuaries, many found them deeply concerning.  The 
estimates made by contemporary actuaries and used by Gilbert and 
others in historical argument assume away the ability of the members 
themselves to address the problem of insolvency.  This point gains 
credibility when allied with the poignant contemporary testimony of 
Moffrey and others, who proclaim the financial ‘crisis’ of the friendly 
societies and offer proposals for its remedy.47   
                                                 
45  Moffrey, Century 
46  Nieson, The rates of mortality and sickness according to the experience for the five 
years, 1871-1875, of the Ancient Order of Foresters Friendly Society, 1875 
47 Moffrey, Century 
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 A fourth problem with the actuarial estimates is that they do not 
take into account member exodus from a society.  Annual data from both 
the Oddfellows and the Foresters report the number of members who quit 
a local court and their reason for quitting.  In the majority of cases by far 
the reason for leaving was lack of payment, though Logan has suggested 
that members of a society might exit without paying funds in order to 
avoid the embarrassment of leaving for other, less socially acceptable, 
reasons.48  Statistics vary by year and region, but suggest strongly that 
member exits were non-trivial in the financial accounts of many friendly 
societies.49  Once a member left, his liabilities would immediately be 
stricken from the lodge balance sheets, while his past contributions would 
remain.  This produces an upward bias on the estimates of insolvency 
produced by contemporary actuaries. 
 A final critique levelled by Emery and Emery against the estimates 
of the 19th century actuaries is their negligence of the variation in claims 
rates across years and the possibility of default of a lodge.  In essence, 
the actuarial estimates only provide an indication of the long-term status 
of the lodge and not the likelihood of failure in any given year.  They, for 
example, do not take into account the possibility of excessively large 
claims in a particular year that could bankrupt a lodge, or the possibility of 
very small claims which could add funds to a society’s balance sheets.  
These criticisms, in concert, present a unified and convincing case 
against the estimates of the 19th century actuaries.  The data provided in 
the Foresters’ court balance sheets allow for a more formal test of the 
insolvency of a court.  Two concepts from the economic of insurance 
                                                 
48 Logan, interview 
49 See: Ancient Order of Foresters District Record Books, Foresters Archives, 
Southampton 
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must first be presented: the implicit degree of risk loading and the 
probability of ruin.50 
 
The Implicit Degree of Risk Loading 
 As suggested in its title, the degree of risk loading measures the 
amount to which the price of an insurance contract, or in this case a 
friendly society contribution, covers the cost of expected claims 
associated with the contract.  It can be derived simply from an equation of 
the price of contract: 
REP +=  
Where P is the price, E is the expected claim, and R is the amount of risk 
loading, or the amount that the insurance company—or friendly society—
takes as “profit” on top of the immediate expenses.51  Assuming that risk 
loading is proportional to the risk embedded in a contract, or the expected 
sick claim, the above equation can be expressed as follows: 
][][ zEzEP π+=  
Where E[z] is the expected claim per member and π is the implicit degree 
of risk loading.  Solving for π, we get: 
1][/ −= zEPπ  
This can be calculated numerically with the price of a friendly society 
contract estimated as the total amount of contributions received per 
member.  Intuitively, if π is equal to zero, or the degree of risk loading is 
zero, the court is behaving risk-neutrally; it is not compensating for any 
future risks but is merely covering the cost of its claims.  If π is less than 
zero, the court's membership price is insufficient to cover the risk profile 
                                                 
50 The first use of these statistics in economic history was likely Emery, Risky Business, 
1996  
51 It is common to see this equation written as, P=C+E+R, where C represents the 
operating costs of the insurance company.  Operating costs are removed from these 
estimates because the friendly societies divided their funds between a sick fund and a 
management fund, both of which had their own sources of income; this paper is 
concerned solely with the operation and valuation of the sick fund.    
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of its membership.  If π is greater than zero, the court's membership fee 
accounts for excess or adverse risks above and beyond operation costs.  
The sign and size of the risk loading estimates have clear implications for 
the financial viability of a court: A financially unsound court would tend to 
have a negative risk loading value as its price would be too low to cover 
the complete costs of expected claims, though the value would not 
necessarily be negative in all years of the court’s operation.  Similarly, a 
financially sound court would have mostly positive risk loading values, 
though in some abnormal years—for example, in the early years of a 
court’s existence—the value might be negative.  There is a possibility that 
the risk loading value could be too large—reflecting an inefficient pricing 
mechanism—though the threshold between sound and excessive risk 
loading would be court specific and difficult to quantify.52  For purposes of 
interpretation, this paper therefore assumes that a positive risk loading 
value is evidence of solvency and a negative value is evidence of 
financial peril.  The risk loading estimate, however, only captures the 
soundness of one year’s pricing schedule and must be examined upon a 
long-run risk horizon.  In order to understand the immediate financial risk 
facing a court in any given year, a different measure is required.    
 
The Probability of Ruin       
 The intuition behind the probability of ruin is straightforward: it 
approximates the likelihood that a court’s claims will be greater than its 
income and assets in a given year, forcing the court to close.  The 
probability of ruin requires three pieces of information for calculation: the 
average or expected sick claim in a given year; the court’s income in each 
year; and the structure of the distribution of sick claims around the mean.  
Once a distributional assumption about the aggregate claims distribution 
has been made and estimates of the expected sick claim in a given year 
                                                 
52 John Murray brought this to my attention 
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have been produced, calculation of the probability of ruin follows from a 
simple numerical process.  First, discussion of the aggregate sick claim 
and the basic operation of a court is required.     
The probability of ruin estimates presented here make several 
assumptions about the internal operation of a court.  First, they assume 
that the court had no access to reinsurance or external sources of funding 
not documented on the court balance sheets.  This is likely to be true.  
Though some of the courts occasionally received supplementary income 
from the Foresters’ district account, this income was recorded in the 
balance sheets along with other sources of income and thus appears in 
the calculation of ruin probabilities.  It is unlikely that any reinsurance 
beyond this took place.  The estimates of probability of ruin also require 
an understanding of the composition of lodge assets.  Most courts had 
floating balances that were reasonably large, though the degree of 
liquidity of these balances likely fluctuated from court to court.  For 
example, one court might have its balance invested in a public house—
with very little access to it in a time of emergency—and another in a 
savings account—readily at hand in times of need.  The data provided 
does not allow for a comprehensive examination of the composition of 
these assets.  This paper will therefore present the probability of ruin in 
three ways: first, with the court’s asset balance included in its annual 
income; second, with the balance excluded from the court’s income, and 
third, with only the income from member contributions included.  
Comparisons between these statistics allow for an understanding of the 
financial significance of various elements of a court’s portfolio.   
 
The Aggregate Claims Distribution           
 Both the probability of ruin and implicit degree of risk loading 
measures are counterfactual: they deal not with what actually happened 
to a court in a given year but with what would have happened in a 
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average year if the court behaved normally.  It is therefore necessary to 
estimate the risk profile of the court, which is reflected in its aggregate 
claims distribution.  The estimate of the aggregate claims distribution has 
important implications for the probability of ruin estimates, which rely on 
an assumption of how claims are distributed around the expected value.  
The modelling process for the aggregate claims distribution therefore 
requires some discussion. 
 First, limitations of the Foresters’ data demand that the claims 
distribution is modelled collectively—as the claims distribution of the 
entire court—rather than individually—as the sum of the individual risk 
profiles of the members of the court.53  This is justified for two reasons.  
First, the Foresters did not engage in actuarial pricing such that the price 
of membership corresponded to the risk profile of the individual.  The 
relationship between an individual price and an individual’s claims 
distribution is therefore of little worth for understanding the court’s 
solvency condition.  Second, the courts’ funds were pooled aggregately 
and distributed uniformly upon sickness.  The size of sick payments was 
not a function of the type of claim but its duration; this, again, makes 
individual claims distributions less informative than the collective 
distribution of claims. 
A second consideration is the distributional shape of the claims 
distribution.  Emery and Emery modelled the claims distribution as a 
Compound-Poisson process composed of a claims number process and 
a claims size process, in which the number of claims in a given year was 
assumed to have a Poisson distribution and the size of claims a Gamma 
distribution.54  This is not possible using the Foresters’ data as the 
number of claims in a given year is not always given.  It is therefore 
necessary to model the total size of claims as a single process.  Figure 2 
                                                 
53 See: Beard et al., Stochastic Risk, 1977; Emery, Risky Business, 1996 
54 Emery and Emery, Young Man’s Benefit 
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shows a histogram of the frequency distribution of claims of various sizes.  
The clustering of the distribution to the left of the mean and the long right-
hand tail suggest that the claims distribution can be modelled effectively 
with a Poisson regression model.55   
 
Figure 2: Histogram of the Frequency of Different Volumes of Sick 
Claims
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 A final consideration for an estimation of the aggregate claims 
distribution is the nature of risk driving the size and distribution of claims.  
The distribution of claims of a court has many determining factors, 
including the occupational risks associated with the dominant local 
industry, the age profile of the court, and the collective risk of viruses and 
other contagious diseases.  Data scarcity makes a complete estimation of 
the claims distribution using these direct variables impossible.  
Accordingly, following Emery and Emery, this paper models the claims 
distribution using indirect proxy variables, including: the number of 
members in a court; the age of the court—the number of years since its 
inception; the square of the age of the court; and dummy variables 
                                                 
55 Satterthwaite, Generalized Poisson Distribution, 1942 
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reflecting whether or not the court was in its first two years, and whether 
or not it was located in a rural area or a town.  The interpretation of these 
variables is relatively straightforward: it is expected that older courts 
made more sick payments, but that this effect marginally decreased with 
age.  Also, courts in their first two years often paid out less sick pay per 
member than courts with longer life spans.  Finally, Foresters’ district 
rules suggest that the size of sick payments made by courts should 
correspond to the level of development in that area, and the Foresters’ 
themselves classified their courts into the three categories of rural, town, 
and city.56  Following the Poisson framework, the regression takes the 
following form: 
)exp( 654
2
3210 TownRuralYoungAgeAgeMemSick βββββββ ++++++=  
Where Sick is the total value of sick payment in pounds for each court in 
each year and the other variables are as explained above.  For purposes 
of simplicity, sick payments were rounded to the nearest pound in 
accordance with the values of old British money.57   
 
Table 5: Poisson Regression Results 
    
Dependent variable: annual sickness 
payment 
 Coefficient
Z-
statistic P-value 
MEM 0.002 105.53 0.000 
AGE 0.0425 22.16 0.000 
AGE2 -0.0005 -15.39 0.000 
YOUNG -0.5997 -7.88 0.000 
RURAL 0.2244 10.22 0.000 
TOWN 0.3022 16.21 0.000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.87; N = 224 
 
                                                 
56 The regression model excludes a dummy on CITY in order to avoid over-
specification 
57 For example, 11 shillings were assumed to be equal to one pound while 9 shillings 
were equal to none 
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 Table 5 shows the Poisson regression results for the above 
equation.  The very low P-values and high Z-statistics suggest that all of 
the coefficients are highly significant at the 95% level.  The coefficients of 
the regression can be interpreted as follows: for a one unit change in the 
dependent variable, the difference in logs of the independent variable, or 
the sick pay, is expected to change by the amount of coefficient.  Most of 
the coefficients are of the desired sign: a court’s claims increase with age 
with decreasing marginal returns, courts in their first two years show 
smaller sick claims, and courts with more members show larger sick 
claims.  The geographic dummy variables are slightly puzzling: the 
coefficients on both RURAL and TOWN are positive, suggesting that 
claims were higher, on average, in rural areas and towns than in the city. 
Figure 3: Predicted vs. Real Sick Pay
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It is possible that friendly societies were more established in rural and 
town areas than in London and thus paid out more sick benefits.  The 
small number of courts included in the sample, however, makes 
interpretation of and extrapolation from these dummy coefficients a 
perilous task.  The scatter plot of predicted and real sick claims in Figure 
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3 shows visually the accuracy of the model in predicting the aggregate 
sick pay of the eight courts.  As shown, the model captures most of the 
variance in sick pay amongst the courts.  In particular, for claims sizes 
below four-hundred, dispersion around the 45-degree line is very small.  
The model also shows little evidence of auto-correlated errors: dispersion 
around the 45-degree line appears to be randomly distributed.  As the 
regression model described above assumes that the predicted values of 
the model adhere to a Poisson distribution, the probability of ruin can be 
numerically calculated by plugging values for the income of the court into 
the Poisson distribution function: 
!
1)Pr(1Pr
I
eI
I
RUIN
λλ −−=−=  
Where I is the income of a court in a given year (either calculated with 
contributions only, annual income from all sources, or income plus 
assets) and λ is the expected number of claims in a given year, estimated 
using the regression model.58      
 
Results: Risk Loading and the Probability of Ruin        
 Table 6 shows the risk loading estimates for five years for each 
court.  Years were chosen to reflect the period before the 1908 Old Age 
Pensions Act and were based on availability of data.  Complete results 
can be found in the appendix.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 See: Beard, Stochastic Risk; the intuition behind this equation is that the probability 
of ruin is equal to the area under the Poisson frequency distribution to the right of I, or 
the court’s annual income  
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Table 6: Sample Risk Loading Estimates 
    
Anchor of Hope Pettiward 
Year Risk Loading Year Risk Loading 
1903 -0.056 1904 -0.302 
1904 -0.072 1905 - 
1905 -0.057 1907 0.168 
1906 -0.086 1908 0.138 
1907 -0.135 1909 0.158 
Equity Brounlow 
Year Risk Loading Year Risk Loading 
1907 0.304 1890 1.05 
1908 0.304 1891 1.01 
1909 0.307 1892 1.02 
1910 0.239 1893 1.29 
1911 0.267 1894 1.03 
Pride of Reading Eleanor Rummyn 
Year Risk Loading Year Risk Loading 
1902 0.333 1900 0.258 
1903 0.321 1901 0.231 
1904 0.288 1902 0.252 
1905 0.295 1903 0.222 
1906 0.241 1904 0.203 
Prince of Wales Perseverence 
Year Risk Loading Year Risk Loading 
1888 0.141 1895 0.551 
1889 0.183 1896 0.523 
1890 0.165 1897 0.488 
1891 0.161 1898 0.470 
1892 0.202 1899 0.471 
 
With the exception of one court, Anchor of Hope, almost all risk 
loading measures were positive and relatively large, sometimes greater 
than one.  Court Pettiward showed a negative risk loading measure in its 
first year of existence but positive values thereafter.  Table 7 shows 
estimates of the probability of ruin for five years for each court.  The 
probability of ruin estimates are given in three formats: including court 
assets—or the court’s available funds—as income; excluding assets as 
income; and treating only member contributions as income.
Table 7: Sample Probability of Ruin Estimates 
        
Anchor of Hope Pettiward 
Year 
Pr 
(A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1903 0.00 0.0001204 0.794 1904 0.00 0.00000183455 0.978 
1904 0.00 0.00 0.862 1905 - - - 
1905 0.00 0.0000193 0.802 1907 0.00 0.00000000002 0.050 
1906 0.00 0.0000449 0.901 1908 0.00 0.00 0.081 
1907 0.00 0.0001220 0.980 1909 0.00 0.00000000124 0.054 
Equity Brounlow 
Year 
Pr 
(A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1907 0.00 0.00 0.00000006 1882 0.00 0.00 0.000002708 
1908 0.00 0.00 0.00000008 1883 0.00 0.0000000000078 0.000000204 
1909 0.00 0.00 0.00000009 1884 0.00 0.0000000008 0.000000032 
1910 0.00 0.00 0.00001824 1885 0.00 0.00 0.0000000002305
1911 0.00 0.00 0.00000301 1886 0.00 0.00 0.0000000000002
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Pride of Reading Eleanor Rummyn 
Year 
Pr 
(A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1907 0.00 0.00 0.00 1901 0.00 0.00 0.00087814 
1908 0.00 0.00 0.000000003 1902 0.00 0.00 0.00246081 
1909 0.00 0.00 0.00 1903 0.00 0.00 0.00112529 
1910 0.00 0.00 0.00 1904 0.00 0.00 0.00337470 
1911 0.00 0.00 0.00 1905 0.00 0.00 0.00671019 
Prince of Wales Perseverance 
Year 
Pr 
(A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1904 0.00 0.00 0.000000285 1889 0.00 0.0000004069 0.000647936190 
1905 0.00 0.00 0.000000286 1890 0.00 0.0000000004 0.000049515204 
1906 0.00 0.00 0.000003020 1891 0.00 0.0000000025 0.000000261688 
1907 0.00 0.00 0.000000123 1892 0.00 0.00 0.000000032234 
1908 0.00 0.00 0.000000768 1893 0.00 0.00 0.000000004679 
Pr(A) represents the ruin probability calculated with income plus assets; Pr(NA) shows the probability of ruin with total 
income but no assets; Pr(C) shows ruin probabilities calculated with just income from contributions 
The three columns should be interpreted as follows: The column in which 
assets are included is the probability that a court’s claims in a given year 
are greater than the court’s total assets and annual income, assuming 
that the court can translate all of its assets into useable funds in time to 
pay out its claims.  The column excluding assets but including all other 
sources of income shows the probability that a court’s claims will exceed 
the income it receives from member contributions, interest, initiation fees, 
and other sources.  The final column shows the probability that a court’s 
claims in a given year will be greater than the court’s income from 
contributions in that year.  If a court were unable to translate its assets or 
income from investments into liquid assets, this column would reflect the 
actual probability of ruin, though it is likely that most courts had at least 
some immediate access to their assets. 
In all three columns, with the exception of Anchor of Hope, 
probabilities of ruin are generally very small.  With assets included, ruin 
probabilities are all zero; without assets, the largest ruin probability is 
0.000122 for Anchor of Hope in 1907; Pettiward in its first year shows a 
ruin probability of 0.978 if only member contributions are included in the 
estimate.  It should be noted that a ruin probability estimate of zero does 
not indicate the impossibility of a year of exceedingly large claims; it 
merely shows that under the assumptions of the Poisson distribution 
adopted in this paper, the probability of receiving claims greater than 
income is unrecognizable.  This opens the question of the optimal ruin 
probability, or the point at which a court becomes financially ruinous.  This 
question can best be answered in relative terms: ruin probabilities with 
total income but without assets for Anchor of Hope are as many as one-
thousand times larger than for Pettiward, the second most financially 
ruinous court.  The relative discrepancy between Pettiward and the other 
six courts, however, is much smaller.  This would seem to suggest that 
Anchor of Hope was operating fundamentally differently than the other 
courts studied, reflected both in its relatively high ruin probabilities and 
consistently negative risk loading values.  Taken in concert, the risk 
loading and probability of ruin estimates cast considerable doubt on the 
hypothesis that the friendly societies were near financial ruin at the turn of 
the 20th century: only one court, Anchor of Hope, shows signs of financial 
stress for the period.            
 
 
V. Between Theory and Evidence: A Game of Insurance 
This paper has so far proceeded with two objectives: first, to 
provide a quantitative assessment of the financial viability of the English 
friendly societies at the turn of the 20th century; and second, to use these 
quantitative results to re-examine the accepted narrative of the origins of 
the welfare state in Britain, in particular the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act.  
The first objective was accomplished in the graphs and tables shown in 
the previous section.  The second has so far been accomplished only 
implicitly.  In order to make full use of the quantitative results contained 
herein a stronger exposition of the theory of institutional change is 
required. 
 Both the theory of institutional change suggested by North and 
others and Gilbert's politically-oriented explanation of the 1908 Old Age 
Pensions Act suggest underlying conditions of disorder in the operation of 
the friendly societies.  For new institutional theorists, this disorder 
necessarily takes the form of fluctuating factor prices, or changes in the 
relative social costs of pension provision between the friendly societies 
and the state.  For Gilbert, the perceived financial decline of the friendly 
societies was a political phenomenon, forcing the societies into tacit 
support of state pension policies they had formerly opposed.  Gilbert's 
argument aligns closely with Charles Lindblom's suggestion that policy is 
made by consensus and not vision: the insolvency of the friendly societies 
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acted to generate conditions of consensus where discord had previously 
prevailed.  Despite their relative differences, the fundamental dynamics of 
both Gilbert’s and the new institutional explanation of the origins of state 
insurance institutions can be demonstrated with a simple logical 
argument, proceeding in three steps.  First, striking demographic and 
social transformations of the late 19th century—manifest in a larger 
industrial labour force and longer life expectancies—dramatically 
increased the demand for both sickness and old-age insurance in Britain.  
Second, this spike in demand financially strained the friendly societies as 
older memberships demanded more sick pay than there existed in 
contributions.  Finally, the deteriorating financial position of the friendly 
societies created a political environment in which state insurance 
provision was highly popular and politically feasible by the early 20th 
century.  The merits of this argument rest upon two nodes: first that the 
friendly societies were rendered financially insolvent by the demographic 
changes of the 20th century; and second that their compromised financial 
position changed the political decision-making conditions of prominent 
society leaders.        
The results presented above, though inherently limited in scope, 
suggest that the Foresters—and perhaps the friendly societies in 
general—were more resilient, more adaptable, and more financially 
sound than the historical literature has so far suggested.  This stems from 
the findings that the membership of the friendly societies was skewed 
towards older members of the population, and that despite the 
vulnerability of older memberships, seven of eight of the Foresters courts 
studied were strongly financially sound.  Recall North’s quotation that 
underlying conditions of “order and disorder” drive the process of 
institutional change.59  The possibility that the friendly societies were 
financially viable institutions at the same time that they were being 
                                                 
59 North, Economic Change, 2005, pp. 7 
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functionally replaced by state provisions suggests a reinterpretation of 
North’s dichotomy.   
 A sometimes crude but often useful starting point for understanding 
institutional change is the theory of games.60  A game simultaneously 
simplifies and concretizes social behaviour, allowing an in-depth 
examination of the incentive structures facing each of its participants.  
Games are also abstract, un-muddled by the nuance of history.  They 
provide insight into what would have been had the actors involved in the 
real-life game ably assessed their competing incentives.  Within this 
context, the decision of insurance providers to enter the insurance market 
can be modelled as a simple game with two players: the friendly societies 
and the state.61  The rules of the game are straightforward: benefits 
accrue to each player from playing the game (selling insurance), and 
benefits are higher in conditions of monopoly (if only one player plays the 
game) than conditions of competition between private and public 
providers.  Benefits to playing are also scaled to the size of a player, so 
larger players will benefit more from playing than smaller ones.  A related 
implication is that smaller players will incur more significant costs than 
larger players when new members join the game.  These rules are 
generally reflective of the real-life insurance market, as described by Barr 
and Borch.62   
 The first players of the game are the friendly societies, and their 
stake in the outcome of the game is deep: by the end of the 19th century 
the friendly societies were large, financially complex, and international 
established institutions. 63  Many of their members were hereditary, 
having inherited membership from their fathers and grandfathers 
                                                 
60 The inspiration for this use of game theory comes from Bates, “The ICO as an 
International Institution,” 1995 
61 Commercial insurers are for the moment ignored; their political and economic 
significance was reasonably limited at the time of the campaign for old age pensions 
62 Barr, Welfare State; Borch, The Economics of Insurance 
63 We are for the moment disregarding commercial insurers 
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(membership was mostly male).64  Most of the affiliated orders of the 
friendly societies had established rituals, ornate regalia, and strong 
leadership positions in both local and national politics, for example 
reflected in their inclusion of honorary members—comprised of 
successful business leaders, members of parliament, and royalty—
amongst their ranks.65  They were, in a word, embedded in the political 
and economic structures of the late Victorian period.  The friendly 
societies’ strong reaction in opposition to the possibility of state 
interference in the insurance market can be understood from this 
entrenchment and the inevitable financial costs of a much larger 
subsidized competitor.  The proclamations from society representatives
cited earlier in this paper underlie this sense of fear of takeover.  In the 
testimony before the 1898 Royal Commission on Old Age Pensions, fo
example, just nine out of thirty-four friendly society representatives even 
weakly supported the possibility of a state pensions act.  At the time, even
this small number was seen as evidence in favour of the possibility that 
the friendly soci
and tax-
 
r 
 
eties would support a state pension scheme.66 
                                                
 The objective of the theory of games is not just to understand the 
preconditions of a political fight but to suggest a possible winner.  The 
friendly societies were actively engaged—at least vocally—in opposition 
to state pension schemes through the end of the 19th century.  By the 
time of the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act, several friendly society 
representatives registered support of state schemes.  Why did the friendly 
societies forfeit their opposition to state schemes when they did?  At the 
core of the theory of games is the uncertainty of social events; in the 
context of game theory, group decisions in conditions of uncertainty are 
naturally probabilistic, composed of likelihoods rather than deterministic 
 
64 Logan, interview 
65 Gosden, Friendly Societies 
66 Thane, Old Age History 
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processes.  The transition from fraternal insurance schemes to state 
provision was equally uncertain, driven both by slow demographic 
transformations and rapid political changes.  The outcome of the game 
can best be understood as a competition between three hypotheses.  
A fourth should be discarded from the start: that the friendly 
societies were in fact insolvent, as suggested by the 19th century 
actuaries.  The limitations of the empirical results presented in the 
previous section have already been thoroughly examined.  Most notable 
of these shortcomings is the lack of institutional depth; the eight courts 
considered inevitably do not meaningfully capture the national condition 
of the friendly societies.  Gilbert's hypothesis can therefore find some 
support in the possibility that the results presented here are biased.  
There are nonetheless two strong reasons to believe that the friendly 
societies were more financially resilient than has been previously 
assumed.  First, the analytical techniques used to address insolvency in 
the 19th century were biased towards financial ruin.  Fundamentally, 19th 
century actuaries were treating the friendly societies as funded insurance 
schemes when in fact they operated pay as you go programs and were 
less vulnerable to long-term changes in the composition of risk.  Second, 
and more importantly, the demographic forces attributed to the friendly 
societies’ decline were national, and therefore would have affected any 
insurance scheme, whether mutual, commercial, or governmental.  The 
results of this paper suggest that the friendly societies were more 
successful at managing these demographic changes than has henceforth 
been assumed.  The following three hypotheses therefore assume that 
the friendly societies were financially sound.  
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Hypothesis 1: The Friendly Societies did not Present a Credible 
Threat to State Insurance Provision 
 The ability of a small player of the insurance game to prevent 
interference from a larger player depends on the credibility of the threat it 
wields.  The political influence of the friendly societies is a case of 
controversy in the literature: Gosden and Gilbert tend to agree that the 
societies were strongly influential amongst parliamentarians while Thane 
suggests that their influence was of limited importance in shaping the 
labour reforms of the 20th century.67  The commentary of the 1898 Royal 
Commission on Old Age Pensions is a useful measure of the political 
clout of the friendly societies; in it, a commissioner suggests that any 
politically viable state pension scheme would require the support of the 
friendly societies.68  
 For the friendly societies to credibly threaten the provision of state 
insurance, two conditions would have to have been met: first, the friendly 
societies would need significant political clout, manifest in access to 
parliamentarians, influence amongst key voting blocs, and a national 
scope and reach; second, they would require long-term institutional 
viability.  The friendly societies at the turn of the 20th century met the first 
condition strongly: they were nationally established, politically savvy, and 
prominent amongst both the labouring classes and political elites.  The 
results of this paper suggest that they met the second condition as well: 
the Foresters—Britain’s second-largest friendly society—show little 
evidence of financial strain in the calculations made here, and also exhibit 
no tendency towards a declining financial position; the risk loading and 
ruin probability measures calculated in section six show no aggregate 
downward trend over time.  The friendly societies did not lose the fight 
with the state because of weaknesses in their political reach or structure.  
                                                 
67 Thane, Old Age History; Williams, Development 
68 Royal Commission 
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Their threat was credible, and indeed was successful in fending off state 
intervention for at least two decades.   
 
Hypothesis 2: The Friendly Societies and the State were Playing a 
Different Game  
 A second consideration in the demise of the friendly societies is 
access; as membership in a society required regular contributions, 
access to society services was unavailable to the unemployed, poor, and 
temporarily employed.  The shape of the 1908 pensions legislation—a 
small, non-contributory scheme to provide pensions benefits to the most 
needy—aligns well with the hypothesis that early state pensions provision 
was designed as supplemental to the work of the friendly societies and 
not an alternative to membership in a friendly society.  Indeed, many of 
the influential participants in the campaign for old age pensions, most 
notably Charles Booth, were first and foremost campaigners for relief of 
the aged poor.69  This argument, however, is limited in two ways.  First, 
the outcome of the 1908 Act must be understood not as the result of a 
concerted political vision but as the most politically viable option for public 
pensions at the time.  The 1908 Act was soon followed by more ambitious 
proposals for national insurance in 1911 and again in 1925.  The political 
debate between the friendly societies and the state that preceded the 
1908 Act was sufficiently vigorous to suggest that the friendly societies 
were aware of the political consequences of the state’s entry into the 
insurance game.  Second, the friendly societies’ initial opposition to state 
pension schemes contrasts sharply with the contention that the friendly 
societies and the state were playing different games.  If the societies were 
unthreatened by state insurance in they early 20th century they would 
have been unthreatened by state insurance in the mid-19th century as 
well.  The transformation of the friendly societies’ attitude towards state 
                                                 
69 Booth, The Aged Poor in England and Wales, 1894 
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provision in the years leading into 1908 cannot be explained by the need 
for pension provision beyond the reach of the friendly societies. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The Friendly Societies were Hedging: Their Mild 
Support of the 1908 was an Attempt to Avoid Passage of a More 
Robust State Scheme 
 As Charles Lindblom’s exposition of “muddling through” suggests, 
political changes are shaped and inspired by the possibility of 
compromise.  Again, the limited nature of the 1908 Act suggests a role for 
political consensus: as the debate surrounding old age pensions grew 
more vibrant, the friendly societies thrust their support behind a washed-
down bill that would scarcely interfere with their operations.  This is 
indeed the argument that Gilbert makes, suggesting that the friendly 
societies even helped to contribute to the structure of the minimalistic, 
non-contributory 1908 Act as an alternative to a contributory pensions 
program that would directly interfere with the business of the friendly 
societies.     
The logic of the insurance game described above, however, offers 
little evidence that compromise between the friendly societies and the 
state would have produced an optimal equilibrium for both parties.  For a 
compromise to be tenable in an insurance game, it must be sustainable, 
or resilient against the natural forces of disorder.  This was not the case in 
the insurance game of the early 20th century.  The friendly societies and 
the state were unequal competitors in the market for insurance, and the 
state’s initial entry into the insurance game precipitated its eventual 
prominence and the demise of mutual insurance in Britain.  Though many 
representatives of the friendly societies exhibited tacit support for the 
1908 Act, their support was never without reservation.70  Similarly, the 
friendly societies’ rejection of any partnership with the state in pension 
                                                 
70 Thane, Old Age History 
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provision suggests their unwillingness for compromise in the insurance 
game.  Though the structure of the 1908 Act was undoubtedly designed 
to win the support of the friendly societies, within the game of insurance 
the passage of the Act cannot be understood solely as a political 
compromise between the friendly societies and the state to avoid more 
ambitious proposals.      
 
 
VI: Conclusions: History Without Evidence, Policy Without 
Process 
 The failures of each of these hypotheses to singlehandedly explain 
the death of the friendly societies and the emergence of state provision of 
old age insurance in Britain exhibits the poverty of mono-causal 
explanations of institutional change.  The contours of history are 
sufficiently complex to sully any clean system of structured interactions 
with the grime of nuance, luck, and randomness.  The objective of the 
economic historian must be thus to separate the systematic from the 
stochastic; in other words, to borrow a term from the evolutionary 
sciences, to understand economic and social change as a process of 
“punctuated equilibrium,” in which deterministic processes are shaped, 
interrupted, and constrained by random ones.71  The Old Age Pensions 
Act of 1908 can neither be understood as the result of simple fluctuations 
in relative costs of pension provision nor as a piece of luck.  It can 
perhaps best be described as the consequence of a constellation of 
interactions, some ongoing and others sudden, that helped to produce a 
political environment amenable to state pensions reform at the turn of the 
20th century. 
                                                 
71 This phrase, originally borrowed from the writings of Stephen Jay Gould, features in 
Douglas North’s writings on institutional change 
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  To better understand the origins of the British welfare state, a 
broader framework than the simple friendly societies-state dichotomy 
adopted here is required.  The 1908 Act borrowed from many political 
roots: from campaigners for reform of the poor law; from cabinet 
members’ impressions of the German model of state insurance; from 
poverty activists’ writings on the aged poor; and from the proclamations 
and decisions made members of the friendly societies.  Around these 
political forces were demographic ones: Britons were living longer; cities 
were growing larger; and the ethos of community, self-help, and 
mutualism that defined the Victorian period was dissipating in a younger 
generation.72  State pension provision was a consequence of these 
changing political circumstances, and the clamouring for pension 
provision amongst many of the political elite in the last quarter of the 19th 
century suggests that passage of the Act was an eventuality to be 
implemented under the right government.  Why, then, did the Act emerge 
in 1908? 
 The results of this paper suggest, unlike Gilbert and many others, 
that the fundamental precondition to the passage of state pensions in 
Britain was not the financial insolvency of the friendly societies but rather 
the creation of a transformative political environment in the early 20th 
century.  Though the financial position of the friendly societies may have 
influenced the pension debate through exhortation—many amongst the 
friendly societies believed their institutions were financially doomed—it is 
unlikely that the belief in insolvency common at the time was driven by 
underlying weaknesses in the operation of the friendly societies.  
Recognizing that the friendly societies were more adaptable than has 
previously been understood, a simple explanation for the 1908 act 
emerges.   
                                                 
72 Some of these transformations are described in Hunt, British Labour History: 1815-
1914, 1981 
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The demand for state provision of pensions was strong from the 
mid-to-late 19th century, a consequence of both rising income levels and 
rising life expectancy.  Rising income levels produced the possibility of 
retirement as well as a stronger awareness of the plight of the poor; rising 
life expectancy produced a class of potential pensioners: aged, working 
class men and women too old to work in the industrial economy but 
unwilling to accept the social stigma of the poor law.  The size of this 
pensioner class grew from the 1860s to the turn of the 20th century, 
increasing accordingly the demand for state provision of pensions.  The 
passage of state insurance schemes in Germany in 1883 provided a 
comparative alternative as well as a political threat to British pension 
reformers: as prime economic and military competitors with Britain, the 
German scheme challenged the British ethic of self-responsibility as an 
efficient way of ordering society.  By the turn of the century, belief in self-
help was weak and evaporating; friendly society admissions were 
declining, the industrial north—the birthplace of the self-help movement—
was shrinking, and the influence of friendly society leaders was eroding.  
The election of a Labour government in 1906 under the leadership of 
David Lloyd George both confirmed these social changes and provided 
an added political threat to opponents of state pensions schemes.  The 
1908 Act grew from this context, and marks the conclusion of the slow 
ebb of friendly society influence in Britain. 
 An early section of this paper described the friendly societies as 
social as well as economic institutions.  This dichotomy was initially 
maintained as a reminder of the societies’ uncharacteristic structure and 
seemingly non-economic disposition; the financial operations of the 
friendly societies were always tied to social functions and their financial 
success was at least in part due to their social relevance.  Recognizing 
the dangers of flippant conjecture, the results of this paper seem to 
suggest that it was not the financial operations of the friendly societies 
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that rendered them incapable of preventing the passage of state 
insurance schemes in the early 20th century, but the decline of their social 
status in late Victorian England.  The shrinking relevance of the friendly 
societies may have been partially hastened by fundamentals—rising life 
expectancy and augmented sickness—but seems to have been driven by 
the changing economic and social demands of a complex and 
increasingly urban industrial economy.  In this way, the institutional death 
of the friendly societies predated 1908, and was written in the gears of 
change that defined the late Victorian period. 
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Appendix I: Complete Risk Loading Results 
Risk Loading 
Anchor of Hope Pettiward 
Year Risk Loading Year Risk Loading 
1895 -0.055 1904 -0.302 
1896 -0.052 1905 - 
1897 -0.049 1906 - 
1898 -0.088 1907 0.168 
1899 -0.040 1908 0.138 
1900 -0.079 1909 0.158 
1901 -0.071 Brounlow 
1902 -0.054 Year Risk Loading 
1903 -0.056 1879 3.141 
1904 -0.072 1880 1.436 
1905 -0.057 1881 0.570 
1906 -0.086 1882 0.564 
1907 -0.135 1883 0.611 
1908 - 1884 0.633 
1909 -0.098 1885 0.720 
1910 -0.095 1886 0.815 
1911 -0.103 1887 0.958 
Equity 1888 1.066 
Year Risk Loading 1889 1.075 
1903 0.270 1890 1.053 
1904 0.281 1891 1.013 
1905 0.283 1892 1.022 
1906 0.286 1893 1.288 
1907 0.304 1894 1.031 
1908 0.304 1895 - 
1909 0.307 1896 0.994 
1910 0.239 1897 1.002 
1911 0.267 Eleanor Rummyn 
Pride of Reading Year Risk Loading 
Year Risk Loading 1879 0.504 
1883 0.961 1880 0.481 
1884 0.967 1881 0.451 
1885 0.918 1882 0.416 
1886 0.940 1883 0.501 
1887 0.788 1884 0.487 
1888 - 1885 0.511 
1889 0.595 1886 0.499 
1890 1.038 1887 0.485 
1891 0.729 1888 0.456 
1892 0.691 1889 0.428 
1893 0.669 1890 0.434 
1894 0.640 1891 0.422 
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1895 0.582 1892 0.419 
1896 0.499 1893 0.391 
1897 0.435 1894 0.385 
1898 0.423 1895 0.389 
1899 0.380 1896 0.371 
1900 0.409 1897 0.293 
1901 - 1898 0.302 
1902 0.333 1899 0.279 
1903 0.321 1900 0.258 
1904 0.288 1901 0.231 
1905 0.295 1902 0.252 
1906 0.241 1903 0.222 
1907 0.213 1904 0.203 
1908 0.184 Perseverence 
1909 0.204 Year Risk Loading 
1910 0.223 1889 0.302 
1911 0.196 1890 0.357 
Prince of Wales 1891 0.458 
Year Risk Loading 1892 0.484 
1888 0.141 1893 0.500 
1889 0.183 1894 0.587 
1890 0.165 1895 0.551 
1891 0.161 1896 0.523 
1892 0.202 1897 0.488 
1893 0.325 1898 0.470 
1894 0.279 1899 0.471 
1895 - 1900 0.470 
1896 - 1901 0.479 
1897 0.284 1902 0.467 
1898 0.435 1903 0.558 
1899 0.273 1904 0.410 
1900 0.240 1905 0.416 
1901 0.265 1906 0.428 
1902 0.246 1907 0.396 
1903 0.224 1908 0.357 
1904 0.219 1909 0.362 
1905 0.215 1910 - 
1906 0.190 1911 - 
1907 0.219 1912 - 
1908 0.203 1913 - 
1909 0.176 1914 - 
1910 0.196 1915 - 
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Appendix II: Complete Probability of Ruin Results  
Probability of Ruin 
    
Anchor of Hope 
Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1895 0.00000000000 0.06715000000 0.77737500000 
1896 0.00000000000 0.01681100000 0.76472600000 
1897 0.00000000000 0.01134300000 0.74956800000 
1898 0.00000000000 0.00383200000 0.89761000000 
1899 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.70853400000 
1900 0.00000000000 0.01022300000 0.87791100000 
1901 0.00000000000 0.00464800000 0.85013800000 
1902 0.00000000000 0.00010200000 0.78555800000 
1903 0.00000000000 0.00012000000 0.79449400000 
1904 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.86183100000 
1905 0.00000000000 0.00001900000 0.80200300000 
1906 0.00000000000 0.00004500000 0.90088500000 
1907 0.00000000000 0.00012200000 0.98031300000 
1908 - - - 
1909 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.93077500000 
1910 0.00000000000 0.00000100000 0.92351500000 
1911 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.94128700000 
Equity 
Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1903 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000073000 
1904 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000041000 
1905 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000038000 
1906 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000035000 
1907 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000006000 
1908 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000008000 
1909 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000009000 
1910 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00001824000 
1911 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000301000 
Pride of Reading 
Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1883 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1884 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1885 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1886 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1887 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1888 - - - 
1889 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1890 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1891 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1892 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1893 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
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1894 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1895 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1896 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1897 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1898 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1899 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1900 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1901 - - - 
1902 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1903 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1904 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1905 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1906 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1907 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1908 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1909 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1910 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1911 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
Prince of Wales 
Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1888 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.01160696040 
1889 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00124787810 
1890 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00221755830 
1891 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00187788740 
1892 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00011547210 
1893 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000500 
1894 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000017070 
1895 - - - 
1896 - - - 
1897 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000001790 
1895 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1899 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000890 
1900 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000015640 
1901 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000740 
1902 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000003970 
1903 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000021910 
1904 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000028490 
1905 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000028640 
1906 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000301990 
1907 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000012260 
1908 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000076840 
1909 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00001130010 
1910 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000110670 
Pettiward 
Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1904 0.00000000000 0.00000183460 0.97836458280 
1905 - - - 
1906 - - - 
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1907 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.04981343360 
1908 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.08114817630 
1909 0.00000000000 0.00000000120 0.05375661360 
Brounlow 
Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1879 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1880 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1881 0.00000000000 0.00000000182 0.00000325018 
1882 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000270810 
1883 0.00000000000 0.00000000001 0.00000020356 
1884 0.00000000000 0.00000000076 0.00000003224 
1885 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000023 
1886 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1887 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1888 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1889 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1890 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1891 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1892 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1893 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1894 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1895 - - - 
1896 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1897 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
Eleanor Rummyn 
Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1879 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000039332 
1880 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000076156 
1881 0.00000000000 0.00000000002 0.00000188741 
1882 0.00000000000 0.00000000003 0.00000626488 
1883 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000006923 
1884 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000011070 
1885 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000002055 
1886 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000003110 
1887 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000005118 
1888 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000020140 
1889 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000070749 
1890 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000040406 
1891 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000067301 
1892 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000071729 
1893 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000301447 
1894 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000336792 
1895 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000226895 
1896 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000593242 
1898 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00021074468 
1899 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00013653681 
1900 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00036331108 
1901 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00087813983 
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1902 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00246081223 
1903 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00112529074 
1904 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00337469959 
1905 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00671018722 
Perseverence 
Year Pr (A) Pr (NA) Pr (C) 
1889 0.00000000000 0.00000040689 0.00064793619 
1890 0.00000000000 0.00000000043 0.00004951520 
1891 0.00000000000 0.00000000255 0.00000026169 
1892 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000003223 
1893 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000468 
1895 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 
1896 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000001 
1897 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000007 
1898 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000050 
1899 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000087 
1900 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000041 
1901 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000019 
1902 - 0.00000000000 0.00000000004 
1903 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000007 
1904 - - - 
1905 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000319 
1906 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000142 
1907 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000045 
1908 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000000573 
1909 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000009636 
1910 0.00000000000 0.00000000000 0.00000006029 
 
 
 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
ECONOMIC HISTORY DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS  
(from 2006 onwards) For a full list of titles visit our webpage at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/  
 
 
2006 
 
WP93 Harbingers of Dissolution?  Grain Prices, Borders and 
Nationalism in the Hapsburg Economy before the First World 
War 
 Max-Stephan Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf 
 
WP94 Rodney Hilton, Marxism and the Transition from Feudalism to 
Capitalism 
 S. R. Epstein 
 Forthcoming in C. Dyer, P. Cross, C. Wickham (eds.) 
Rodney Hilton’s Middle Ages, 400-1600 Cambridge UP 2007 
 
WP95 Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power with Profit. The 
Management of Britain’s National Debt, 1756-1815 
 Patrick Karl O’Brien 
 
WP96 Gresham on Horseback: The Monetary Roots of Spanish 
American Political Fragmentation in the Nineteenth Century 
 Maria Alejandra Irigoin 
 
 
2007 
 
WP97 An Historical Analysis of the Expansion of Compulsory 
Schooling in Europe after the Second World War 
 Martina Viarengo 
 
WP98 Universal Banking Failure? An Analysis of the Contrasting 
Responses of the Amsterdamsche Bank and the 
Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging to the Dutch Financial Crisis of 
the 1920s 
 Christopher Louis Colvin 
 
WP99 The Triumph and Denouement of the British Fiscal State: 
Taxation for the Wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France, 1793-1815. 
 Patrick Karl O’Brien 
WP100 Origins of Catch-up Failure: Comparative Productivity Growth in 
the Hapsburg Empire, 1870-1910 
 Max-Stephan Schulze 
 
WP101 Was Dick Whittington Taller Than Those He Left Behind?  
Anthropometric Measures, Migration and the Quality of life in 
Early Nineteenth Century London 
 Jane Humphries and Tim Leunig 
 
WP102 The Evolution of Entertainment Consumption and the 
Emergence of Cinema, 1890-1940 
 Gerben Bakker 
 
WP103 Is Social Capital Persistent? Comparative Measurement in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
 Marta Felis Rota 
 
WP104 Structural Change and the Growth Contribution of Services: 
How Motion Pictures Industrialized US Spectator Entertainment 
 Gerben Bakker 
 
WP105 The Jesuits as Knowledge Brokers Between Europe and China 
(1582-1773): Shaping European Views of the Middle Kingdom 
 Ashley E. Millar 
 
WP106 Regional Income Dispersion and Market Potential in the Late 
Nineteenth Century Habsburg Empire 
 Max-Stephan Schulze 
 
 
2008 
 
WP107 ‘The Big Problem of the Petty Coins’, and how it could be 
solved in the late Middle Ages 
 Oliver Volckart 
 
WP108 The Anglo-German Industrial Productivity Puzzle, 1895-1935: A 
Restatement and a Possible Resolution 
 Albrecht Ritschl 
 
WP109 The History, Nature and Economic Significance of an 
Exceptional Fiscal State for the Growth of the British Economy, 
1453-1815 
 Patrick O’Brien 
WP110 The Economic History of Sovereignty: Communal 
Responsibility, the Extended Family, and the Firm 
 Lars Boerner and Albrecht Ritschl 
 
WP111 A Stakeholder Empire: The Political Economy of Spanish 
Imperial Rule in America 
 Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin 
 
WP112 The U.S. Business Cycle, 1867-1995: Dynamic Factor Analysis 
vs. Reconstructed National Accounts 
 Albrecht Ritschl, Samad Sarferaz and Martin Uebele 
 
WP113 Understanding West German Economic Growth in the 1950s 
 Barry Eichengreen and Albrecht Ritschl 
 
 
2009 
 
WP114 War and Wealth: Economic Opportunity Before and After the 
Civil War, 1850-1870 
 Taylor Jaworski 
 
WP115 Business Cycles and Economic Policy, 1914-1945: A Survey 
 Albrecht Ritschl and Tobias Straumann 
 
WP116 The Impact of School Provision on Pupil Attendance: Evidence 
From the Early 20th Century 
 Mary MacKinnon and Chris Minns 
 
WP117 Why Easter Island Collapsed: An Answer for an Enduring 
Question 
 Barzin Pakandam 
 
WP118 Rules and Reality: Quantifying the Practice of Apprenticeship in 
Early Modern Europe 
 Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis 
 
WP119 Time and Productivity Growth in Services: How Motion Pictures 
Industrialized Entertainment 
 Gerben Bakker 
 
WP120 The Pattern of Trade in Seventeenth-Century Mughal India: 
Towards An Economic Explanation 
 Jagjeet Lally 
WP121 Bairoch Revisited. Tariff Structure and Growth in the Late 19th 
Century 
 Antonio Tena-Junguito 
 
WP122 Evolution of Living Standards and Human Capital in China in 
18-20th Centuries: Evidences from Real Wage and 
Anthropometrics 
 Joerg Baten, Debin Ma, Stephen Morgan and Qing Wang 
 
WP123 Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China, 1738-1925: in 
Comparison with Europe, Japan, and India 
 Robert C. Allen, Jean-Pascal Bassino, Debin Ma, Christine 
Moll-Murata, Jan Luiten van Zanden 
 
WP124 Law and Economic Change in Traditional China: A Comparative 
Perspective 
 Debin Ma 
 
WP125 Leaving Home and Entering Service: The Age of 
Apprenticeship in Early Modern London 
 Patrick Wallis, Cliff Webb and Chris Minns 
 
WP126 After the Great Debasement, 1544-51: Did Gresham’s Law 
Apply? 
 Ling-Fan Li 
 
WP127 Did Globalization Aid Industrial Development in Colonial India? 
A Study of Knowledge Transfer in the Iron Industry 
 Tirthankar Roy 
 
WP128 The Education and Training of Gentry Sons in Early-Modern 
England 
 Patrick Wallis and Cliff Webb 
 
WP129 Does Trade Explain Europe’s Rise? Geography, Market Size 
and Economic Development 
 Roman Studer 
 
WP130 Depression Econometrics: A FAVAR Model of Monetary Policy 
During the Great Depression 
 Pooyan Amir Ahmadi and Albrecht Ritschl 
 
 
 
WP131 The Economic Legacies of the ‘Thin White Line’: Indirect Rule 
and the Comparative Development of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Peter Richens 
 
WP132 Money, States and Empire: Financial Integration Cycles and 
Institutional Change in Central Europe, 1400-1520 
 David Chilosi and Oliver Volckart 
 
WP133 Regional Market Integration in Italy During the Unification 
(1832-1882) 
 Anna Missiaia 
 
 
2010 
 
WP134 Total Factor Productivity for the Royal Navy from Victory at 
Texal (1653) to Triumph at Trafalgar (1805) 
 Patrick Karl O’Brien FBA and Xavier Duran 
 
WP135 From Sickness to Death: The Financial Viability of the English 
Friendly Societies and Coming of the Old Age Pensions Act, 
1875-1908 
 Nicholas Broten 
 
 
